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POLITICAL JUSTICE: THE USE OF LEGAL PROCEDURE FOR POLITICAL ENDS.

By Otto Kirchheimer. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press.
1961. Pp. 452. $8.50.
This book is a definitive study of the use of the legal process by the state
against individuals as an instrument of political power. "Something is
called political if it is thought to relate in a particularly intensive way to
the interests of the community." (p. 26) This reviewer has put the
meaning of the term political as follows: "As the intensity of attachment of
the actors in a situation of conflict to the competing values involved therein
increases and the number of actors in the society who are involved in such
value conflict increases, the likelihood will increase of the characterization
of the situation as one of a political, rather than a legal, nature.... When
conflict in a society involves competing group demands based on incompatible values held by such groups, its resolution is typically the task
of the political process and institutions, rather than the legal."1 In the
view of Justice Jackson, decisions which are "confided to the political
departments of the government ... are delicate, complex, and involve large
elements of prophecy ... and should be undertaken only by those directly
responsible to the people whose welfare they advance or imperil."2
The political trial involves the prosecution by the state of one or more
individuals for the commission of criminal offenses. The offenses may be
either common crimes or criminal acts directed against the state, such as
treason and sedition. Modem security legislation seeks "to protect the
political order from any intellectual, propagandist, and especially organizing
activity directed toward revolution. . . . [T]he area of genuine political
criticism is overhung by clouds which hide the light separating fact, fancy
and wish. It is not easy to disentangle the components and isolate the
maliciously slanderous contribution. Many a recent statute has ignored the
difficulty, subjecting legitimate criticism to punitive provisions." (pp. 41,
43)
The political trial, as an instrument for achieving and preserving
political authority, tears an incident loose from the historical context in
which it was intertwined and turns the "strongest spotlights on it, to disclose
its minutest detail. ... The past is reconstructed for the sake of the future
as a possible weapon in the battle for political domination." The trial
requires a "segment of history" to be reconstructed. Although the past
segment is part of "a still present conflict," the judge is allowed "to
disregard its present elements and treat it exclusively as a past event." But
any trial entails risk that its reconstruction of a past event through the
1 CARLSTON, LAw AND ORGANIZATION IN "WORLD SOCIETY, ch. VII (to be published by
the University of Illinois Press, Urbana, 1962) •
2 Chicago &: So. Air Lines, Inc. v. Waterman S.S. Co., 333 U.S. 103, Ill (1948).
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testimony of witnesses will not take place as anticipated. In the political
trial, it is imperative that witnesses reenact their predetermined roles with
scrupulous fidelity, otherwise the political message which the trial was
intended to communicate will be lost. (pp. 110-12)
The use of the legal process to suppress groups who dissent in principle
from an established regime "has been directed so far against small groups
of little importance in domestic affairs.... Open repression ... is bound
to miss the target and repel friends when the persecuted group assumes
the stature of a mass movement, controlling a large segment (say, more than
twenty percent) of the popular vote.... Even if a combination of social
and economic pressure and police operations were enough to enforce the
ban, there might be enough resistance to throw the judicial machinery out
of gear and cancel what is the benefit of limited repression, the chance to
preserve intact the legal process and the framework of democratic institutions." (pp. 159-60)
The degree of consensus of a society upon a single value system or, put
in opposing terms, the heterogeneity of a society in terms of its sharing of
values and the priority accorded values, is a factor of first importance in
the viability of its legal system. The author develops this principle as
follows: "The meaning of legal consciousness in a heterogeneous society
thus offers special problems. If no informal consensus exists on fundamental
community issues, the judges cannot play their traditional role in realizing
the community value structure and pointing it up in relation to specific
issues. . . . Impartiality presupposes a commonly accepted starting proposition. If as his point of departure the judge uses propositions which
are emphatically rejected by substantial elements in the community, he
will not be able to rely on the presumption of obedience owed to his office,
even if he can show that he has adhered with some consistency to his initial
proposition." (p. 215)
Dissent from the politics of an industrial society will reject the ethic of
conformity and embrace instead loyalty to a group or cause: "The politics
of an industrial society have often become a rational interplay of interest
organizations whose outward form is a gigantic and permanent popularity
contest. Members of the legal profession functioning as custodians of the
political game must themselves conform to its rules and precepts. Why,
then, should anyone else be privileged to reject the prevailing political
framework and insist on recreating politics in the image of a community
resting on loyalty to group or cause rather than on rational, civilized, if
uninspiring, calculation of profit and loss?"
The lawyer's task in a political trial taking place in a mechanized,
standardized, conformist society is to use "creative ingenuity ... in whipping
diffuse elements of a given situation into convincing enough shape to obtain
a favorable reaction for his client." (p. 243) A functionary of the Czech
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Lawyers' Organization pointed to the dichotomy of the lawyer's devotion
to the interest of his client and public interest, which is involved in a
political trial, as follows: "If the lawyer wants to keep to the principle
that he has to preserve the interest of his clients in conformity with the
interests of society and the principle of objective truth, he has to analyze
clearly every case. He has to conform to the objective truth and the
interests of society. For this reason we use the term 'justified interest of
the client,' and only those interests may be taken care of by the lawyer."
(p. 244) (Emphasis supplied.)
The author examines the history of the manner in which political
trials have been used to protect regimes from subversion and overthrow.
The principles governing the use of political trials as a support for authority
are elucidated and developed through illustrative examples. The requisite
characteristics of the roles of the defendant and his lawyer, together with
the prosecutor and the judge, are thoroughly explored. There are many
perceptive statements about the nature of the judicial process and the task
of the judge in trials of this character.
One chapter is devoted to the operation of the judicial process in
societies characterized by "democratic centralism," in which the judiciary
became integrated with the political institutions. In such societies, the
judiciary becomes an instrument for attaining the changing political
objectives of the state. "The essence of socialist legality, then, is guaranteeing that orders and signals are unfailingly observed at all subordinate levels.
. . . When policies and official interpretation change, legality attaches to
the new task at hand. Under no condition is it called upon to mediate
between today's objectives of the sovereign and yesterday's expectations
of the subject." (p. 298)
The Nuremberg trials are explored as an aspect of trials by successor
regimes. They are termed "the most important 'successor' trial in modem
history." With respect to the crime against peace charge, the author states:
"Had the noble purpose of the crime against peace charge succeeded, had
it helped to lay a foundation for a new world order, the uncertain juridical
foundation of the charge would now be overlooked and the enterprise
praised as the rock on which the withdrawal of the states' rights to conduct
aggressive warfare came to rest. At the coalition pursuing the Nuremberg
enterprise broke up before the ink on the Nuremberg judgment had time
to dry, the dissensions among the wartime partners threw a shadow over
the whole affair." (pp. 323, 324)
'W"ith regard to the crimes against humanity charge, the author
concludes: "The newly coined crimes against humanity concept (Article 6c
of the charter) corresponds to a deeply felt concern over the social realities
of our age: the advent of policies intent on and leading to debasing or
blotting out the existence of whole nations or races. But if the social and
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political mechanism employed in such cases is unfortunately very clear, the
legal formulas to cover and repress such actions remain problematic. In the
absence of a world authority to establish the boundary line between atrocity
beyond the pale and legitimate policy reserved for the individual state,
the French government and its Algerian foes, the South African government
and the representatives of the downtrodden negro and colored population,
not to mention the Hungarian regime and its adversaries and victims, might
continue to have a very different viewpoint on the meaning of the concept."
(p. 326)
The final appraisal of Nuremberg is that: "The concrete condition
under which the Nuremberg litigation arose and the too inclusive scope
of the indictment may make it difficult for us to separate the circumstantial
elements which it shares with all other successor trials from its own lasting
contribution: that it defined where the realm of politics ends or rather, is
transformed into the concerns of the human condition, the survival of
mankind in both its universality and diversity." (p. 341)
The concluding portion of the book is entitled "Political Justice
Modified: Asylum and Clemency." It embodies a "search for rational
elements in asylum' and clemency practice." (p. 349)
This review has summarized the highlights of the author's thesis to
demonstrate the thoughtful, analytical manner in which data of political
trials are employed to develop in a creative way significant principles and
propositions in political and legal theory. The literature of law and
jurisprudence has only episodically and tangentially dealt with the problem
of the political trial, which the author investigates with such thoroughness.
This study focuses directly upon the principal aspects of the problem and
is a most important contribution.
Kenneth S. Carlston,
Professor of Law,
University of Illinois

